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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines how the processes and practices of hazard management skew decision-making towards
current concerns, shaping the treatment of the future in the present. We reveal how norms of science and policy
combine to manage the complexity, uncertainty and intangibility inherent in working to long-term time
horizons by defining, bounding and codifying how we understand the future. These processes, we argue,
frequently but not inevitably, constrain the influence of long-term considerations, resulting in ‘hazardscapes’
where risks become embedded spatially, transferred temporally and difficult for future generations to reverse.
We introduce the notion of a ‘tyranny of the present’ as a means to critique the ways in which the future is heard
in risk management, that is, how the future is known, bounded, and incorporated, and the legacies that this may
create. Overall, we highlight how more effective management of risks is not just a matter of better data or
improved policy, rather that discourses of risk are subject to a ‘presentist’ bias, the underpinnings of which need
to be better understood in order to make more effective decisions for future generations.
1. Introduction
The impact and the incidence of disasters associated with environ-
mental hazards has been on the rise. In a 2015 study, UNISDR [52]
estimated that since 2005 around 1.5 bn people have been affected
globally, involving economic costs of around US$1.3 trillion. In
response there has been an emphasis on improving risk management
by increasing understanding of environmental hazards and their
potential impacts, notably when and where they may happen, how
damaging they might be, or who and what is most vulnerable. Due to
the emphasis on both incidence and impact, risk management is
inherently interdisciplinary, situated at the nexus of science and
society. The approach has been characterized as ‘evidence-led’, where
science assesses risks and enables decisions to take into account
multiple scales and time periods [50,52]. Typical measures focus on
understanding the probability of future events, with policy aiming to
address future risks, for instance, by delineating areas as inappropriate
for development due to high flood risk [49], ‘red-zoning’ properties in
areas of high seismic risk [46], or reducing the potential for damage by
improving current building standards ([7]).
It is at this juncture of the voices of the present and the future that
this paper is positioned. Specifically, we examine how effective current
decision-making processes are at considering future hazards. This is a
critical and challenging issue if society wants to adapt to future threats,
such as those presented by climate change. While we can make the
future more knowable and predictable through improved evidence or
scientific modelling, risks can be unruly and resist temporal demarca-
tion: hazards do not necessarily advance towards us in a rational,
linear, and readily predictable fashion. In the face of global climate
change, the risk environment is becoming more dynamic, with patterns
of change increasing in speed, uncertainty and complexity. For
instance, more frequent extreme weather events may change patterns
of coastal erosion and flooding. This move to a more complex risk
milieu poses challenges for disciplines that regulate future develop-
ment, not least planning and legal systems, which rely on clarity and
certainty in decision-making, with limited flexibility to address chan-
ging risks ([27,30,48,56]). Once development is consented, unless
conditions specify otherwise, this tends to be granted in perpetuity in
order to provide certainty for developers. This system however, whilst
reducing private or developer risks, can create new societal risks by
locking-in land uses that may be difficult to transform, resulting in
higher remedial costs and exposure to risks that could have been
potentially avoided ([4,44]).
We use New Zealand as a case study to explore the way that the
future, and future risks in particular, are understood and considered in
land use planning. Risk from this perspective is usually defined as
consisting of three other variables: hazard, exposure and vulnerability,
but it should be noted that these are also dependent variables. As
Oliver-Smith et al. ([38]: 5) explain: ‘Most hazard is a reflection of both
socially constructed as well as physical processes; exposure is a
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reflection of how social relations of production unfold in territory and
geography; while vulnerability characterizes a range of social, econom-
ic, political and cultural conditions.’ New Zealand is one of the most
exposed countries in the world to environmental hazards [20], being
subject to a wide range of perils, such as tsunamis, flooding, coastal
erosion, wildfires, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. It is also one of
the most hazard aware countries globally, particularly after experien-
cing the devastating 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquakes, which had a
significant impact upon the thinking of citizens, government, and
scientists alike [29,43]. Selecting one country also enables a multi-
hazard approach to be taken, which allows more general messages to be
taken for other countries similarly grappling with the effective manage-
ment of hazards. The data collection was qualitative and interpretive to
effectively unpack the expert views and privileged knowledge that exists
at the science-policy interface. It consisted of in-depth interviews with
24 key people connected with hazard planning. These were selected to
provide a wide-ranging overview of perspectives from critical actors
and agencies across multiple scales, sectors, locations and risks.
Interviewees included central government officials, regional and dis-
trict council officials who have been active in this field, researchers and
scientific advisors to government on climate change and hazard
management, politicians, and representatives from planning, local
government, and the insurance industry.
This article has a number of key messages. Firstly, that the future
brings three main challenges for decision-making: complexity, uncer-
tainty and intangibility, and that science and policy norms in risk
management struggle to deal with these. Compared to immediate
policy concerns, hazards in the distant future appear more phantas-
magoric—far off and insubstantial—in comparison to the ‘facts’ pro-
vided by historic data sets, or the expediency and materiality of short-
term political concerns. This brings us to our second point: the broad
structures of risk management foster a ‘tyranny of the present’ that
needs to be recognised and mitigated in policy in order to allow future
risks to have a stronger voice in current decision making.
2. The scientific and political disciplining of the future
Hazards are natural phenomena that, when become intertwined
with human systems, potentially create risks to be managed [37,58]. As
such, this section focuses on the science-policy interface to better
understand how the future is disciplined so it can be incorporated into
current decisions. In doing so, we argue that the operation of science
and policy serve to create and maintain specific ‘hazardscapes’—a term
that highlights the complex discursive environment within which
“hazardous spaces are produced, contested and struggled over” ([36]:
570).
2.1. The role of science
Our analysis of how structures of decision-making create and
constitute hazardscapes is rooted in the view that science is not a
separate artefact to be brought to society, it is a product of society—the
way we know and represent the world is inseparable from the ways in
which we choose to live in it [22]. For our study, this lays the
foundation of how scientific choices regarding understanding or
codifying complex and uncertain futures can produce particular
hazardscapes. Bell [2], for instance, argued that the selection of
research methods can confer respectability on certain intervention
choices and privilege particular outcomes, a situation described as the
‘tyranny of methodology’.
The pressure on science to discipline the future by quantifying risk
in monetary terms, such as the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA),
provides a good example of the limitations of this methodological
inclination. The CBA approach is valued because it requires detailed
evidence of costs and benefits, and conforms to the apparent preference
of many policy makers for economic approaches that provide ‘law-like
regularities’ to simplify complexity ([39]: 487). It provides a clear and
quantifiable basis against which policy decisions, such as flood manage-
ment schemes, can be justified and defended; thus helping produce
decisions which can defend potential legal challenges or future liability
claims [24]. However, various social and psychological costs struggle to
be quantified within this framework. For example, in the aftermath of
disasters Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder can affect people, and there
are frequently increased incidences of anxiety, depression or even
marital stress ([10,14,35]). Moreover, the methodology not only
commonly assumes the future to be comparable to the present, but
importantly outlines when it ceases to have a voice—all cost-benefit
decisions are bounded temporally, say for 5, 10 or 20 years [28]. Few
cost benefit analyses stretch beyond these artificial boundaries as the
complexities amplify and the uncertainties resist quantification. As a
consequence, CBA has been criticized as unfair to future generations
[16].
These artificial time limits and boundaries are important for our
argument as they exercise important shaping influences on how
scientific information is commissioned or marshalled to reflect the
needs of the decision-making tool. As such, it is apparent that decision-
makers do not just receive data; management demands also influence
the operation of science. Rothstein et. al. ([47]: 12) describe this
interlinked relationship as ‘risk colonisation’, where to conform to the
limitations of decision-making systems, regulatory processes and the
use of science also become a means to protect institutions and confer
legitimacy.
In a related fashion, there are fears that the way in which scientific
evidence is requested by policy-makers can lead to a ‘false precision’ in
predictive techniques. For instance, while drawing a single probability
line on a map to delineate high risk areas is convenient for decision-
makers, it can mask significant data uncertainties [28,54]. In the case
of flooding one recent review concluded that the more we understand
its complexity, the less we can be sure of ‘concrete’ facts [49], leading
Hayes et al. ([17]: 16) to argue: “there seems to be mismatch between
our understanding of flooding as complex and fuzzy and our assess-
ment of flooding as quantifiable and precise.”
Similarly, recent critiques of the concept of stationarity provide
further insights into the dilemmas at the science-policy interface.
Stationarity suggests we can understand, categorise and predict the
future behavior of natural systems, based on an assumption that
fluctuations occur within broadly known parameters (Milly et al.,
[33]). For example, hazards can be predicted based on their historical
frequency, leading to framings such as a 1-in-a-100 year event
probability. This probability (based on the past) is then considered in
the context of consequences (based on the present), to determine the
degree of risk. These confidence or probability levels represent efforts
to discipline time and codify uncertainty for decision-making. The
obvious problem with such simplified calculations is that in the context
of climate change and rapid urbanization, natural and social systems
are so dynamic that we should question the extent to which the past is
an accurate predictor of future risk. Several studies argue how
'stationarity is dead' [33,34,6] as a result of changing extreme event
frequencies due to climate change (e.g. high storminess), the rising
awareness of risk aggregation effects (e.g. landslides and coastal
erosion), and how human activity (e.g. urbanization) changes and
compounds the risk profile. Discussing hazards in this way has also
been criticized as contributing towards the creation of a false sense of
security concerning when the next event may occur, with, for example,
a move from a 1-in-a-100 year terminology to presenting the same risk
as being a 1% chance per annum [53]. Using the past to predict the
future has, in effect, become less useful than previously as our knowl-
edge of complexity and uncertainty has increased.
Moreover, there is a view that despite an increasingly sophisticated
understanding of the complexity of natural and human systems and
continuous improvements in modelling, scientists have not necessarily
produced models that are better at predicting the future [1,49]. For
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instance, despite huge advances in climate change models, the un-
certainty range has remained stubbornly unchanged for around 30
years [45]. Knowledge is not a process of incremental reassurance;
science progresses by deepening understanding of existing phenomena,
or by uncovering new uncertainties, both of which can present fresh
challenges that can make the future even more unruly. Assumptions
will always be built into scientific models, such as how linear and
stationary do we assume the future to be, or how to account for shocks,
so there will always be a degree of epistemological uncertainty that is in
tension with decision-making desires. This relates to another intrinsic
temporal problem, well established by Popper [42], that efforts to
accurately predict the future are detrimentally affected by our very
presence: the future may look little like the past; both society and
hazards are incredibly dynamic and complex.
Research in the field of climate change adaptation offers further
insights into how improved understanding of future uncertainty is
being acknowledged. Here, a number of authors describe multi-decadal
considerations as being of ‘deep uncertainty’ and question the effec-
tiveness of traditional analytical tools in enabling adaptation to avoid
future costs (e.g. [5,26,9]). As such, alternative approaches and
decision-making frameworks have been proposed to address the
inherent uncertainty of future risks, such as integrated resilience
[55], adopting co-management approaches with communities at risk
[3], pursuing ‘no-regret’ or ‘low-regret’ options [18], or dynamic
adaptive pathways and tipping points [15]. Some of these policy
innovations and techniques are now starting to be used in a number
of countries, for example Ranger et. al., [44] discuss how the Thames
Estuary 2100 project adopted a strategy that can adapt as information
changes.
Together these examples highlight the tensions and choices in-
volved in incorporating complexity and uncertainty into decision-
making. The future represents inductive knowledge and, in comparison
to the past, a comparatively weak mastery of circumstances. As such, it
can erode trust in expert systems [12], including hazard management.
In part response, science and policy norms, such as the scientific
mapping of hazards serve to bound spatially and constrain temporally.
Therefore, hazard science and policy are not merely technical enter-
prises using objective data, but assemblages of real power: they shape
new hazardscapes, support the functioning of institutions, and influ-
ence how the future is known, considered and prioritized.
Consequently, the ways that science operates will inevitably produce
certain configurations of hazardscapes, particularly when it is charged
with defining and identifying risks as evidence for politicians and other
decision-makers, who, as we will now explore, exert their own
influence.
2.2. Politics and Policy
The existence of a political propensity to privilege current genera-
tions over those of future ones has often been claimed, though can be
difficult to prove. Thompson [51] refers to this tendency as 'political
presentism', arguing that a form of ‘democratic myopia’ can cause
neglect of the future due to a combination of the psychological
tendency to prefer the immediate, the desire for government that
responds to the current demands of the electorate and the influence of
short electoral cycles. In a similar vein, Jacobs [21] notes the strong
influence of electoral safety and the poor valuation of long-term returns
within politics. Of particular interest for this argument is his assertion
that while politics is designed to manage trade-offs, the reliance on
quantified evidence and cost-benefit figures within decision-making
means that it favours past data and current lost opportunities over
more intangible possible future benefits.
There is an alternative view, however, which argues that the future
is well-served within politics. Future generations should have more
knowledge, expertise and technologies at their disposal, which means
they are able to look after their own concerns. Moreover, enabling
development creates economic growth and opportunities to enhance
the capacity of future citizens to respond to threats. From this
perspective there is a strong justice argument: if a current development
opportunity is prevented due to a fear of a long-term future risk it
means you are transferring the use of a resource away from the present
to the future. This leads us into moral territory where we trade-off the
economic welfare of current generations against that of future genera-
tions. Perhaps more fundamentally, by considering future citizens we
are involving them in a democratic process without knowing their
opinion. They may have favoured a development going ahead in the
present had they been in a position to be asked.
Thinking of such debates in relation to hazards, we can see how
tensions emerge, particularly around land use. Planning systems are
geared to producing decisions which combine clarity, consistency and
permanence, resulting in outcomes that are typically less reversible
than many other public policy fields. There are exceptions: mineral
mining rights, for instance, tend to be time-limited. However, devel-
opment rights for housing tend to granted in perpetuity, or at least
without specifying an end date, in part because introducing flexibility
may mean authorities avoid tough decisions or provide an avenue for
legal challenge [40,6]. The result is a rigid system of rights that once
granted are difficult to reverse, whilst at a larger scale as new
neighbourhoods and their infrastructure become established they
similarly become politically difficult and economically costly to change.
Layered over such considerations are issues of liability, such as if a
court were to decide that development consents were wrongly given
and a future damaging event might reasonably have been predicted.
One way of understanding these temporal trade-offs is to consider
risk management techniques as time-space ordering devices [11] that
help predict the likely occurrence and location of major hazard events.
They are mechanisms for rendering the future more knowable, which
to improve accuracy and credibility must impose temporal and
geographical limits. In this sense they are framing devices, and the
choices over which space and which time means they are more than
neutral technical decisions. Putting boundaries around territorial
geographies and preferred timescales not only creates hazardscapes,
but imposes limits on how we identify potential future problems and
prepare for future hazards.
This highlights that effective risk management requires an acknowl-
edgment of how complexity and uncertainty is coded into knowable,
quantifiable risks in order to balance alternatives against each other
and determine priorities. This is related to the powerful rationality that
risk management practices imbue. As Ewald ([8]: 207) succinctly put
it: “to calculate a risk is to master time, to discipline the future”. It is a
means of enabling distanciation—the process by which transactions
occur between current and future agents. The approach is essentially a
means of disciplining unruly hazards, where complexity and uncer-
tainty are defined and coded so future risks can be inserted within a
linear, containered conception of time that outwardly links past,
present and future. In a similar vein, even as scientists and politicians
recognize that environmental hazards do not respect geographical
boundaries, in practice risk management practices have calculative
rationalities for assigning levels of risk within bounded geographies,
such as producing hazard maps or CBA calculations for territorial
units.
Thinking of hazard maps as time-space ordering devices draws
attention to the ways in which time and space are instrumentally
containered in order to help make the future more comprehensible,
more knowable. In other words, it draws attention to the choices
implicit in drawing boundaries around both space and time and the
political work this entails. By contrast, adopting a less bounded, more
relational view of time and space opens up new possibilities for
thinking about how risks are understood and managed. Recent work
on relational thinking, for instance, critiques instrumental conceptions
of space and time as insensitive to alternative understandings of lived
time that might coexist, such as seasonal or social forms of connected-
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ness across space and time, or the coming together of disaster under-
standings that mix the past, present and future [19,31,32]. Put another
way, there is a tendency in science and politics to ‘fix’ risks in time and
space, from a past earthquake in area X, or a previous flood in year Y,
to the future sea-level rise in an area in 2100. This does, however, help
erode the connection to the here and now (see [57]).
3. The Production of Hazardscapes and the Tyranny of the
Present
3.1. Coding complexity: reconciling contested logics, approaches and
timescales
The previous section highlighted how a key scientific approach to
reduce complexity and provide clarity is to tightly define and code the
scope of inquiry. Our interviews revealed how time is routinely
bounded in this manner, but the way that this is operationalised differs
depending upon the actor or agency involved and their dominant logic;
typically scientific, engineering, or financial.
For scientists, hazards tended to be categorised into a time frame
that reflects IPCC projections, or the steady incremental change over a
given time period, such as projected sea level rise until a named year.
The second logic by which time was understood and codified related to
the norms of engineering. For example, estimates of:
the number of exceedances within a certain life, a planning lifetime,
or asset lifetime (Scientific Advisor 3).
Here, design or performance standards bound time, such as the
height of a flood defence constructed to protect up to a specific return
period, or the predicted built lifetime of an asset. This links to the third
defining logic: financial. The interviewed insurers in particular revealed
a concern with how key institutions for risk management bound the
future in accordance with financial value or market norms, which are
usually short-term from a hazard perspective. The time periods also
differed by sector, as one interviewee explained:
insurers only price risk for twelve months, a mortgage lender sees
risk for 25 years (Private Sector 2).
This interviewee from the insurance sector suggested that banks
should take more interest in risk issues than they currently do, but also
pointed to fundamental tensions in the differing logics for under-
standing risk across a wide range of governmental agencies and private
institutions.
For central government, one of the drivers in identifying hazards
more accurately was said to be a growing awareness of the costs to
government of recovering from major earthquakes, such as those in
Christchurch, expressed in terms of contingent liability:
It's commonly used in balance sheets… where they might be
exposed to a legal action in a court case. They don’t know whether
they’re going to win or lose the court case, but if they lose they may
have a debt to pay… that's called a contingent liability, and that's
what government is quite interested in.
Prior to the Canterbury earthquakes, I don’t think it was envisaged
that there would be… several billion dollars’ worth of cost ultimately
to the taxpayer. So, that's like a future earthquake event on a similar
scale as a contingent liability sitting on the government's books
(Civil Servant 1).
This related to a parallel set of concerns about the ‘moral hazard’
logics of disaster recovery policy. For policy makers the worry was that
helping out those affected might set an undesirable precedent for future
governments and lead to householders refraining from insuring their
homes. This was a particular issue in Christchurch where after the
earthquake the government agreed to cover the costs of moving for
those living in the red zone, which covered the most ‘at risk areas’
where development needed to be strictly controlled:
So the tendency of national governments… when big hazard events
occur like the Canterbury earthquakes is to step in and help bail
people out…. And so essentially all they’re doing are doing are
passing on those costs to the next government until the events occur
again. You can see that's an impossible system dynamic.
If you look at the Canterbury earthquakes and look at the red zone
buyout offers… they were very clear that those that didn’t have
insurance would not be part of those offers, so they were clear about
trying not to create any additional moral hazard precedents. But, of
course, everyone around the country is aware of the red zone buy
out, so [people say], “well, why don’t you red zone us and bail us
out?” (Civil Servant 5).
For government, the logic was that an accurate assessment of risk
was a way of ensuring risks were managed and appropriate insurance
sought, helping reduce the financial liabilities of future governments.
The Canterbury earthquakes were also said to have been important
in focusing attention on the particular challenges involved when
planning for low frequency, high impact events such as these, acknowl-
edging that previously perhaps the focus had been more on addressing
frequent but less damaging events, such as flooding. In the words of
one interviewee this had led to a policy re-think:
it was a real wake-up call that, “hey, we need to think about the low
probability events as well, and they are pretty damaging” (Scientific
Adviser 5).
We can see from such comments that how the government,
engineering or finance sectors know and bound risk is in considerable
part shaped by concerns about future liability within the lifetime of the
loan, the building, or the policy. However, longer-term and aggregated
risks are rising quickly up the policy agenda. Many of our interviewees
talked about how we are in a new era in terms similar to the
‘stationarity is dead’ debate [33], arguing that the future is more
dynamic and less predictable as a result of climate change and
urbanization. For example, with regard to flooding in one area, one
local government official said:
We had a period between 2004 and 2012 where we had around six
[flood] events that were greater than 100 year return periods (Local
Government 2).
The problem of using historic events as a logic to code time was
further highlighted with regard to coastal erosion, sea-level rise and, in
particular, the unpredictability of seismic activity. From this perspec-
tive experience of hazards and knowledge of their complex interactions
were destabilizing belief in the value of those scientific models and
representation practices which relied heavily on past frequencies of a
single hazard as a guide to future risks. One interviewee powerfully
noted the interaction between risks:
large swathes of eastern Christchurch and Waimakariri have fallen
by up to a metre as a result of the earthquakes. We've had nominally
50 years of sea level rise in one go (Local Government 9).
Perhaps more fundamentally with regard to the ways that science is
used to code complexity and understand the future, after the 2010–11
Canterbury earthquakes there was a view that historic decisions about
development had often not drawn on community or indigenous
knowledge. Even where such knowledge was known to be out there,
there had been a preference for quantitative scientific data and a
reluctance to engage with more qualitative information. However:
once we started talking with some of the members one on one, they
shared their anecdotal evidence that had been passed down from
one generation to another about previous events and there were
several of them that described the same time and the same location
and pretty similarly the extent of it, but that's qualitative informa-
tion as opposed to actually mapping boulder sizes and locations
(Local Government 2).
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Another official told us about how shortly after the Canterbury
earthquakes:
a viewpoint emerging out of local Māori was, “oh, you silly bloody
Pākehā [a term used by Māori to describe predominately white
European migrants] you never should have built that damn city on
that swamp”. There's a sense in which there was strong local
knowledge of strengths and weaknesses of the land long before
you (Local Government 9).
This disjuncture in the logics, timescales and types of information
used by officials and indigenous communities in part reflected attitudes
to understanding and coding knowledge about hazards, which until
recently meant that government scientists and officials ‘saw’ the past
and future in certain ways, privileging particular ways of understanding
time. Here hard data was seen as almost the antithesis of cultural
understandings of risk recorded through story-telling and other
techniques for storing and sharing knowledge.
3.2. Manufacturing certainty: reconciling variegated knowledge,
aggregated risks, and quicker decisions
One of the prominent issues in our interviews concerned the
difficulties in dealing with scientific uncertainty. Not all hazards were
equally well understood, so some hazards are much more uncertain
and complex than others. While the relatively recent rise of hazards
such as surface water flooding and tsunamis, meant that there had been
less work done to develop both modelling techniques and historical
databases to inform policy responses:
Certainly for New Zealand, surface water, whatever you call it,
urban flash flooding… it's way behind compared with our river
modelling (Scientific Adviser 5).
The science does move really quickly in some areas, particularly
around tsunami modelling. You know, it's just going, going, going
(Scientific Adviser 1).
The big problem I guess, with particularly debris flow, is a lot of
uncertainties around it and [an] inability to validate your models to
a high degree of accuracy…. we know there’ve been other events…
but nobody has actually gone out and monitored that work because
it happened decades and centuries before (Local Government 2).
Following the Christchurch earthquakes, awareness rose concern-
ing how impacts became intensified through risk interaction. For
instance, land movement made soil liquefaction, boulderfalls or flood-
ing more likely. Both scientists and policy makers told us of their
growing interest in trying to understand risk interactions or aggrega-
tion. These also emerged as important in a series of public disputes
over how maps set out new boundaries for areas deemed at risk from
coastal erosion from sea level rise and more extreme weather events.
One interviewee told us that modelling sea level rise on its own was
relatively unproblematic, but modelling patterns of coastal erosion in
the context of future sea level rise had proved much harder to calculate
as the historical datasets were not there.
In terms of modelling it's [predicting sea level rise] pretty easy. If we
have very good historical information such as tide gauges, rain
gauges or river gauges, then we have something quite tangible that
we can hang our hats onto, as long as it's a long enough time series.
From that you can produce some statistical forecasts in terms of
what the frequencies and return periods are… So that's easyish. But
it's when you have some of these physical processes where it's very
hard to put numbers on and where there hasn’t been that long term
monitoring record or beach profile data sets (Local Government 5).
So even as scientists sought to set out the objective basis for their
predictive models, in practice the possibility of different scientists using
different assumptions, timescales, data or models meant that there was
a degree of subjectivity involved both in commissioning particular
groups of experts and in selecting how to use the information provided.
This was seen a problem in the context of moving away from the
practices of drawing up hazard maps with single probabilistic lines (e.g.
1-in-a-100 years likelihood) and presenting these to the public as the
basis for determining whether an area would be defended or public
infrastructure provided. This approach had led to a series of high
profile disputes regarding the science behind coastal hazard maps,
including one which ended up at judicial review, leading to the Kapiti
District Council deciding to withdraw its coastal hazard maps from its
website.
There's talk of us being in a post-science world, post-normal science
world, and any source of information presented well, potentially has
some credence with the community, and if there's sufficient
motivation to find out amongst individuals or a community, their
own information, then they may well challenge the official view, and
that's what we saw in Kapiti, where the consultant used by the
council was… challenged, from a number of different angles,
because the community was well-resourced to seek its own infor-
mation (Civil Servant 4).
Reflecting on these issues, New Zealand's Parliamentary
Commissioner for the Environment [41] recently recommended to
government that more time be allowed for complex issues such as these
to be debated and policies developed, involving greater consultation
with affected communities. However this advice conflicted with a
theme which emerged from many of our interviews: a political drive
to simplify rules to speed up decision-making in planning. Amongst the
issues raised was that while the scientific community wanted to provide
full details of the complexity of assessments, including sometimes
multiple modellings of a hazard to help generate more options, from
the political sphere there was a drive to streamline decision-making
processes into a ‘tick box methodology’ where the question concerning
a development proposal would be reduced to a quick: ‘well, is it
permitted or not? Make up your mind’ (Local Government 9). The
political imperative to make consenting and permitted development
rules clearer and faster essentially requires reducing complex science
into something definite and defendable.
The rules have got to be certain… otherwise people just either ignore
it or are getting stuff wrong (Local Government 6).
A push for certainty to avoid costly court appeals was also identified
as key for decision-makers. This issue in part reflected the nature of
New Zealand's legal system, which has struggled to deal with scientific
uncertainty and the consequent need for greater policy flexibility
([13,6,27,40]). This produced an additional factor that drove a
simplification of science in policy, as unclear or multiple findings
tended to produce a situation where the policy could be challenged. As
one interviewee told us:
The planning process in New Zealand tends to enforce single
numbers because otherwise you are arguing in the Environment
Court (Scientific Advisor 2).
The problems with enacting a single long-term future was particu-
larly apparent in relation to changing existing land use rights as
knowledge of future risks evolves, leading one of our interviewees to
reflect:
we don’t really have a very good mechanism for managing existing
use rights. We have quite good mechanisms for protecting them, but
not for managing them (Civil Servant 5).
While the judicial system responds to evidence put before it and
interprets the law and planning instruments based on the law, it is clear
that existing use rights are very hard to challenge politically and
judicially. Consequently, unless a regional council wants to implement
a specific rule designed to expunge existing land uses, there is a danger
that problems get passed on to future actors and agencies to deal with.
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3.3. The presentist problem: reconciling a strong present and a weak
future
The need to provide certainty, whether regarding land rights or
economic analyses, highlights a core tension where the intangibility of
the future is in conflict with the tangibility of the present. Political
priorities were a recurring theme in our interviews, not least in the
context of recovery efforts following the Christchurch earthquakes,
which for one interviewee (Local Government 9) highlighted how new
mechanisms were needed for dealing with long-term risk, because
more immediate priorities always seemed to be prioritized.This is not
to say that addressing future hazards was not a strong concern
politically, but more that current political systems tended to prioritise
current needs and short-term risks over more intangible future threats:
Most of the debate in Christchurch is about people are already living
there, they are already at risk. What do we do to respond to that?
(Local Government 1).
Whilst it is often argued that disasters open up critical space for
radical policy changes, whether by ‘policy windows’ [23] or capacity
building [25], our interviews pointed to the ways major hazard events
led to a privileging of the present over the future, as short-term
priorities dominated, such as rehousing, rebuilding, refitting or recov-
ery. The limits of science as a political influence were also repeatedly
highlighted by our interviewees, such as:
you might have objective scientific evidence, engineering evidence,
the best you can get on one side, which to scientists and engineers
that's quite a strong argument in itself that there's a need to act, but
on the other side you’ve got the political survival aspects, and if it's
not in the political agenda at the time you’re struggling to get any
traction (Local Government 2).
The long-term time horizons associated with certain risks further
highlighted a presentist bias within politics that affects multiple
hazards. Sea-level rise was identified as an example of a distant future
risk that struggles to gain influence in the present with one interviewee
explaining how attempts to plan for the future might be met with
comments along the lines of:
this is 50–100 years out you're talking. Hell, I'm worried about why
isn't some bugger fixing my damn roads right now (Local
Government 9).
Even in risk aware New Zealand, attempts to plan for earthquakes
struggled to gain traction in the case of pressing contemporary
concerns alongside a misunderstanding of risk:
Of course people will say, “well, our next event isn't going to be for
another 16,000 years or whatever so I'm not going to worry about
that” (Local Government 9).
In addition, there was a potential systemic issue around how
individuals might ignore risks in the hope that governments would
pick up the bill in the future:
People being people, something is going to be a, I don’t know, a 1-
in-a-100 years, they will think, “oh the chances of that happening
are virtually zero and therefore I am going to carry on purchasing
properties in this area”. And the capital keeps on going up and you
get into the situation where the properties get so expensive that
maybe those people have the influence on the council to get them to
pay for the mitigation risks (Private Sector 1).
At one level, the pressures favouring short-termism in individual,
business and public decision-making might be seen as a manifestation
of recent moves to develop more market oriented policy solutions and a
desire to put more responsibility for decisions into the hands of
individuals rather than governments. Certainly some of our public
sector interviewees identified such issues as part of the context in
which they operated. But perhaps more notable was how interviewees
in both central and local government were keen to point out that they
saw it as part of their role to make good decisions for the longer term:
It's harder too where you have… large scale infrequent events, but
have big consequences. I mean, they might have a one or 200 year
return period and people struggle to get their mind around that and
councils, planners, and so on, we typically work to those horizons.
We’re not just here for this generation, we’re here for future
generations (Local Government 2).
The very intangibility of the distant future made it difficult for
markets to assess and price future risks accurately. Markets might
provide some of the solutions for preparing for the future, but
government always seems to be in the lead when addressing the
long-term. Overall, our interviews revealed considerable evidence of
public sector willingness to engage with long-term hazard planning.
The debate was rather about how the structures of science and policy
may enable or resist that desire.
3.4. Changing direction: sticky risks and weak reversibility
One of the ways to better appreciate the impact of a tyranny of the
present on hazardscapes is to reflect upon how today's embedded risks
are a result of yesterday's decisions. During interviews, decisions
concerning the location of both the capital and third largest city in
New Zealand were criticized as being poor in retrospect, and ones
which are now locked in and impossible to change:
like everywhere we’re dealing with the legacy of where everything
has been built… if you looked at whether Wellington should be
where it is now you’d probably say, “no, it's a stupid place to build a
city” (Civil Servant 5).
Similarly, referring to Christchurch and the multiple risks that it is
now known to be subject to:
if we had the knowledge that we do today we would probably say,
“no, we don’t want people there” (Local Government 1).
The situation planners face involves dealing with changed aware-
ness of risk and dealing with development with existing use rights.
Again, issues of creating precedents that might increase the liability of
future governments very much concerned civil servants.
The horse has bolted when some of the existing development is
done; we need to manage that as best we can. The problem with
doing that though is, again, when you are looking at development,
especially residential development, is that once you create that
freehold title it is there indefinitely (Local Government 5).
So there is a long-term dynamic question about what the govern-
ment decides to do to support councils to manage some kind of
transition out of some areas that are higher risk, because other-
wise… the call to be bailed out all just becomes more and more
intense (Civil Servant 5).
One of the issues raised by interviewees was the difficulty in proving
the future benefits of refusing development. The problem lay in
countering the claims of developers about creating jobs or homes
against the uncertain possibility of avoiding a future hazardous event.
So a planner might reject:
a development in the wrong area that might save three lives 50
years down the track but you might not ever know that… And it is
the same with the flood risk, you might avert some serious flood
damage happening. But probably, because the development there
has not gone ahead, you won’t be thanked (Local Government 8).
An example of the positive impacts from more stringent hazard
zoning came from the North Island where an interviewee explained to
us how:
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the first coastal erosion hazard zone study we did in the very early
‘80s had sea level rise included, and incredibly it was a 0.7 m sea
level rise that was built into that hazard zone, which has stood the
test of time. But the developer was miffed that they lost the first row
of potential houses… On the other hand people really appreciate
and use that foreshore area for a lot of recreational walking and so
on, so in hindsight it's been of benefit to the community (Scientific
Advisor 5).
One way of improving policy for the long-term suggested by some of
our interviewees was to invest heavily in the evidence base to allow
future decision-makers to better understand how risks have changed.
This led one to argue for:
monitoring and measuring the bugger out of everything. Getting
that information, taking the photos, measuring as much as we can…
and getting that baseline information. That is going to help some-
one 50 years down the track (Local Government 5).
The legacy of the past in the present, and current approaches to
hazard management, demonstrate a presentist power on hazardscapes
and, as a consequence, a means of risk transfer from one generation to
the next. In the main, those who benefit from the economic develop-
ment of land will not be living there over the very long-term, while
those who currently live there and resist new regulations may not be
there in 50 years. Therefore, to make current investment decisions
more certain we may make future society more risky by transferring
costs. Adaptation measures provide a good example. They encompass a
variety of techniques that appear to be inclusive of the future, but they
are a mode of rescheduling; a way to acknowledge future implications
but in a way that passes costs forward—the problem remains, it is just
deferred. In this sense, adaptations are temporary and can contribute
to lock-in. For instance, with regard to flooding policy:
raising the floor levels for homes, that buys you time… [but] that
house shouldn’t be there to be honest, it's just saying if there is an
effect in the next 50 or 100 years the effect will be less because it is
higher. But you still need to issue people with dinghies at some
point (Local Government 1).
As there will always be uncertainty, the challenge is not necessarily
to give permanent development rights, rather to build in reversibility
and adaptability—a situation where regrets are few, time is used
efficiently, and transferable costs are low. This is not just a case of
turning down development, but rather of finding new means for
managing the future. This was leading some policy makers at the local
level to argue for ways of providing permission in areas where the risk
might be foreseeable, but some way off, for instance with sea level rise.
One interviewee contended that in such a case it is inefficient,
to lock away land that you are going to get two, three generations of
use out of… Rather than having a freehold title, there needs to be
some other ownership entity that doesn’t have that permanence,
such as some sort of leasehold title where there are review periods
guaranteed for the next 50 years… when we will have hopefully a lot
better information… That type of risk profile might be acceptable for
many (Local Government 5).
Similarly, some aspects of risk transfer and residual risks could be
dealt with by innovative policy tools, such as triggers that activate after
certain events as mentioned earlier. However, while these hold
potential in theory, it was cautioned by interviewees that these
approaches are still subject to political pressures—any future measures
will still have to navigate elements such as budgets and competing
priorities, when the time comes.
4. Conclusion
There are some reflective experts, pioneering practitioners and
responsible communities who are trying to plan effectively for the
future, but this paper highlights how the structures of decision making
hinder these intentions. Science and policy code uncertain futures and
allow distanciation to occur. Within this process there is an assumption
that future needs are internalised by present decision-makers, but with
regard to decisions we can see how a number of elements impede this
consideration. The first is the historicism of decision-making, demon-
strated by the demand for certainty, the need to provide clarity for
investment, the protection of property rights, or long-standing legal
precedent. Second is the scientific norms of hazard decision making, as
seen from the effect of practices such as mapping, quantification or
cost-benefit analysis, where the future may represent weak inductive
knowledge compared to the ‘certainty’ of current and historical
quantitative datasets. The third is the politics of decision-making,
which is evidenced by aspects such as the wish to avoid liability, the
requirement for political and institutional defence, the desire for short-
term returns, or easy risk transfer. All of these strengthen the argument
that structures of decision making create certain hazardscapes, where
risks may be embedded, transferred, and hard to reverse.
We introduced the notion of a ‘tyranny of the present’ as a means to
critique the extent to which the future is heard in risk management;
how it is known, bounded, and incorporated, and the legacies that this
may create. The arguments in the paper lend weight to the view that the
tyranny exists, is systemic, and is related to the long-standing ways in
which we assign value to science, the influence of politics, and the
processes by which we make decisions. We argue that the notion of a
tyranny of the present allows us to better understand the broader
contexts of long-term decision-making and the insider-outsider effects
that occur. For instance, privileging certainty, as is the norm in
decision making, also runs the risk of privileging regrets; an unfortu-
nate corollary that has helped constitute a number of current proble-
matic hazardscapes as well as increasing future risks. As such, a
challenge for hazard management is not just with regard to under-
standing and managing impacts, but rather looking deeper at the
system which defines and assigns value to the future.
We emphasise how effective risk management is not just a matter of
better data, or improved policy, rather that powerful discourses exert a
presentist bias that is largely hidden and needs to be recognised in
order to allow future considerations to better influence current
decisions. While science theoretically expands time-space distanciation
to allow long-term risks to be considered, it is also evident that politics
and practice compresses this time, dragging attention back to the
present. A further message is that while society may not know what the
future will offer, certainty and inflexibility create legacies that are
difficult to manage. Therefore, rather than focus on designing a policy
response for area X, or producing slightly better modelling for area Y, a
key principle should be flexibility—to leave future citizens more choices
as evidence changes. Those arguments relating to the need for more
innovative and flexible systems for land use rights, more consistent
logics across sectors, or flexible policy tools that can better enable a
transition from risky areas, provide good examples of an important
emerging research agenda. These approaches help give future genera-
tions a voice in current decision making, and are essentially a process
of ensuring policy can be reflective, responsive and reversible in a way
that can partially transcend the structural problems of short-term
political demands or scientific constraints.
An appreciation of the constitution on hazardscapes therefore
provides a lens by which to unpack how time is understood and shaped
by the structures and agencies of decision making. Even when the
future has a stronger voice due to events making hazards more real,
urgent and less ‘othered’, these underlying forces remain unchanged;
complexity and uncertainty persist and struggle to compete against the
tyranny of the present. Where gains occur and adaptability is
embedded, significant effort and engagement has taken place, high-
lighting how the structures of decision making require increased
academic and policy focus. It is in this positive vein of reexamining
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the science-policy interface that the paper is positioned. Appreciating
the ways that hazardscapes are shaped and the legacies they may leave
can stimulate the discussion of new decision making processes that
allow the future to exert influence in the present and, in doing so, help
resolve the tension between an unknowable future and a knowable
now.
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